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Abstract
Based on the in-depth analysis of the essence and features of vague phenomena,
this paper focuses on establishing the axiomatical foundation of membership de-
gree theory for vague phenomena, presents an axiomatic system to govern mem-
bership degrees and their interconnections. On this basis, the concept of vague
partition is introduced, further, the concept of fuzzy set introduced by Zadeh in
1965 is redefined based on vague partition from the perspective of axiomatization.
The thesis defended in this paper is that the relationship among vague attribute val-
ues should be the starting point to recognize and model vague phenomena from a
quantitative view.
Keywords: Vagueness, Axiom, Vague membership space, Vague partition,
Fuzzy set
1. The mathematical analysis of vagueness
Fuzzy sets introduced by Zadeh [37] in 1965 are designed to model or describe
the extensions of vague concepts, such as Young, Warm, Tall, etc.. To be more
precise, the extension of a vague concept ϕ is taken to be a fuzzy set A, which
is defined by a membership function µϕ : U → [0,1], where U is the domain of
discourse. For every element x ∈U , the value µϕ(x) ∈ [0,1] is the membership
degree of x in A, or the degree to which one believes that the element x have the
attribute ϕ . And after that, some important contributions are made to fuzzy sets
and fuzzy logic by Zadeh and others [2, 4, 6, 8, 15, 24, 25, 26, 29, 40].
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However, is fuzzy set or fuzzy logic the suitable and effective tool for dealing
with vagueness? Seemingly the answer is not so obviously. In [3], Beˇhounek
said that "Fuzzy logic cannot claim to be the logic of vagueness · · · most of which
are not captured by deductive fuzzy logic". Novák said in [26] that "fuzzy logic
is not the logic of vagueness but the logic of ordered structure · · · there are not
yet many results on the applied side · · · It is still not fully clear which logic is
the most convenient to solve problems related to models of vagueness and their
applications". From these comments, you can see that fuzzy set theory is still at
its first stage, its theoretical foundation is far from complete.
In the following, we list three typical questions in Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory:
First, for a given vague concept, how to define the membership function of
its extension? And how to justify its rationality? For example, for vague concept
"tall", if we define its membership functions on the domain of discourse "Cambo-
dian men" and "Dutch men" respectively, are these two functions same? Another
example, if we define the membership functions for "tall" on the domain of dis-
course "Japanese men" in 1900 and in 2016 respectively, are these two functions
same? Common sense tells us that these functions should be very different. On
the other hand, whether any mapping from any nonempty set U to [0,1] (e.g.
y = sin(1/x) or any probability distribution function) will determine a fuzzy set?
If the answer is yes, then which vague concept will be modelled by the mapping?
In addition, given a membership degree a ∈ [0,1] with respect to a fuzzy set A,
how to find the objects whose membership degree is exactly equal to a? or more
general, is approximately equal to a? These questions are still hard to answer in
Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory. Intuitively, the time and space factors should be consid-
ered when we deal with vagueness.
Second, suppose the time and space have been fixed when we discuss a vague
concept (e.g. "young", denoted by ϕ), whether we should consider the relationship
between this vague concept "young" and its related vague concepts (e.g. "old",
denoted by ψ) in defining the membership function µϕ of its extension? To be
more precise, the membership functions µϕ and µψ are independent of each other,
or are associated with each other? If they are independent of each other, then is it
reasonable to define µϕ(x) = µψ (x) = 0.7 for an object x? If they are correlative
of each other, then how to reflect their relationship into the definitions of their
membership functions?
Third, the membership function µA of a fuzzy set A is a mapping from the
domain of discourse U to [0,1], where U is the collection of objects. Under this
definition, whether the relations between fuzzy sets in the same domain of dis-
course U should always be truth-functional? Its answer is still not clear. In [34],
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D. Edgington raised doubts about this. She presented the following example:
suppose we have a collection U of balls of various sizes and colors. These are in-
dependent variables: how close a ball is to a clear case of "small" (in the context)
is unaffected by its color; and how close it is to a clear case of "red" is unaffected
by its size. Let R and S be the fuzzy sets in U , denotes vague concepts "red" and
"small", respectively. For balls a,b and c, suppose:
R(a) = 1,R(b) = R(c) = 0.5; S(a) = S(b) = 0.5,S(c) = 0.
According to the operations "∩(intersection)" and "∪(union)" for fuzzy sets, (R∩
S)(a) = min{R(a),S(a)} = 0.5 = min{R(b),S(b)} = (R∩ S)(b), (R∪ S)(b) =
max{R(b),S(b)}= 0.5 = max{R(c),S(c)}= (R∪ S)(c). But it is plausible that
a is a better case for vague concept "red and small" than b, and b is a better case
for "red or small" than c. What’s the reasons? Maybe someone will say that we
can use t-norms and t-conorms (or other operators) to model the intersection and
union of fuzzy sets, but which one will work? In our view, the reasons lie not in
the interpretations of set-theoretic operations.
This paper aims at doing some attempts to answer the above three questions.
For simplicity, in this paper, we will focus on our discussion of vague concepts
in a fixed time and space, and believe that all things are interrelated and interact
on each other, we have to learn to contradistinguish one thing from another. For
example, the existence of other colors except for "red" makes it possible for us
to distinguish "red" from other colors, thus if you want to understand what "red"
is, then you need also to know what "yellow", "orange" and other colors are.
For the same reason, if you want to understand what a tall man is like, you also
need to know what a short man is like. Inspired by this thought, the relationship
between a vague predicate and its other closely related vague predicates will be
the starting point of our discussion. From a global and overall of view, we will
try to establish a mathematical model of treating phenomena of vagueness from an
axiomatic point of view, it is our hope that the model could serve as the theoretical
foundation of fuzzy set theory and its application, and further serve as the starting
point of formalized theory of dealing with vague phenomena.
As a preliminary, firstly we must know what is vagueness, and what is its main
characteristics? Otherwise, our study will be like that water without a source and
a tree without roots.
In [39], Zadeh wrote "Although the terms fuzzy and vague are frequently used
interchangeably in the literature, there is, in fact, a significant difference between
them. Specifically, a proposition, p, is fuzzy if it contains words which are labels
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of fuzzy sets; and p is vague if it is both fuzzy and insufficiently specific for a
particular purpose." However, what words should be the labels of fuzzy sets,
Zadeh didn’t given further explanation.
In this paper, the terms "fuzzy" and "vague" will be used interchangeably un-
less otherwise stated, its exact meaning will be explained in detail in next section.
2. What is vagueness?
In the 1902 Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology [30], Charles Sander
Peirce explained the entry "vague" as follows:
A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning
which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the
speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition.
By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance
of the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits of language were indetermi-
nate. (Peirce 1902, 748)
From Peirce’s description, vagueness is intrinsically indeterminacy, which
means a certain state of object that is not absolutely affirmative or negative to say
which attribute should be assigned to the object, and vagueness is related closely
to the use of natural language, and will result in borderline cases. But, how ex-
actly does vagueness arise? what exactly vague phenomena are? And what is its
essence?
2.1. Sorites Paradoxes
The word "sorites" derives from the Greek word for heap, the paradox is so
named because of its original characterization, attributed to Eubulides of Miletus.
Vague predicates are susceptible to Sorites Paradoxes. As we mentioned above,
the extension of a vague concept (or predicate) has borderline cases, can not be
clear and well defined. In other words, there are objects which one cannot say with
certainty whether belong to a group of objects which are identified with this con-
cept or which exhibit characteristics that have this predicate. Hence, the "class"
X of all objects which have the property ϕ (vague predicate) cannot be taken as
a set (crisp set) since the vagueness of property ϕ makes it impossible for us to
characterize the "class" precisely and unambiguously. For example, the predicate
"is tall" is vague because a man who is 1.75 meters in height is neither clearly tall
nor clearly non-tall. No amount of conceptual analysis or empirical investigation
can determine whether a 1.75-meter man is tall, as we mentioned above, it is a
kind of intrinsically indeterminacy.
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Many people will agree that almost all vague phenomena can be attributed to
the vagueness of predicates. Consider the predicate "is a heap", the paradox goes
as follows: consider a heap of wheat from which grains are individually removed.
One might construct the argument, using premises, as follows:
• Premise 1: 1010 grains of wheat is a heap of wheat;
• Premise 2: when we remove one grain of wheat from a heap of wheat, the
remain is still a heap.
Repeated applications of Premise 2 (each time starting with one fewer grain) even-
tually forces one to accept the conclusion that a heap may be composed of just one
grain of wheat. There are some other variations of the paradox, in fact, this para-
dox can be reconstructed for a variety of predicates, for example, with "is tall",
"is rich", "is old", "is blue", "is bald", and so on.
The root cause of the paradox lies in the existence of borderline cases brought
about by the use of vague predicates which are usually expressed by natural lan-
guage. Even if you may know all relevant information about vague predicates,
such as, the exact number of these wheats, the precise value of the height of a
man, the precise value of the wavelength of a kind of color, etc., you are still un-
able to determine whether these wheats form a heap, whether this man is a tall
man, whether this kind of color is red, all these are not because we can’t under-
stand these predicates, but because of the vagueness of these predicates. That is
to say, the vagueness of a vague predicate doesn’t come from the shortcomings
of the cognitive abilities of the human itself, but is the result of combined effect
by a kind of objective attribute existing in the objects itself and human subjective
cognitive style.
2.2. Multidimensional vagueness
So far we have considered only these vague predicates which are determined
by an one-dimensional variation (or only one attribute), such as height for "tall",
age for "young" and temperature for "hot". But in many real problems, the vague
predicates are multidimensional: several different dimensions of variation (or sev-
eral attributes) are involved in determining their applicability. The applicability
of "big", when it is used to describe a man, depends on both height and volume.
Whether a ball is counted as a "small and red ball" depends not only on the vol-
ume of ball but also on its color. Moreover, there are still some vague predicates
in which it is not even a clear-cut set of dimensions determining the applicabil-
ity of these predicates: it is not clear which factors are related to each other and
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blend into one another. For example, the applicability of "good", which is used
to describe a student, whether a student should be counted as "good", maybe dif-
ferent people have different views on it, it is very difficult to present a universally
accepted criterion to judge whether a student is good. Of course, multidimen-
sional vague predicates also share all these features mentioned above of vague
predicates.
It is important to note, however, that when one applies fuzzy sets to model
multidimensional vagueness, then the range of membership functions should be
a subset in [0,1]n instead of [0,1], where n denotes the number of dimensions of
a multidimensional vague predicate. In this way, it is easy to remove D. Edging-
ton’s doubts mentioned in Section 1. More generally, one can take a complete
distributive residuated lattice [35] as the range of membership function. More
details please refer to [12, 13].
2.3. Higher-order vagueness
Let F be a vague predicate, then there is no (sharp) boundary between the
objects that determinately satisfy F and those that do not determinately satisfy
F , that is, it admits borderline case where it is unclear whether F applies. This
is the so-called first-order vagueness. Intuitively, it seems that there is also no
(sharp) boundary between the objects that determinately satisfy F and the bor-
derline objects in the borderline case, nor is there a sharp boundary between the
borderline objects and those that do not determinately satisfy F . This is called
as second-order vagueness. Proceeding in this way, one can define the concepts
of "third-order vagueness", "fourth-order vagueness" etc., which are uniformly
referred to as "higher-order vagueness".
When one applies fuzzy sets to model higher-order vagueness, the problem is
how to define the membership functions of fuzzy sets. For example, let ϕ be the
statement "Tom is tall, if Tom is 1.8 metres in height", how much is the truth value
of ϕ? If one set its truth value equal to 0.6 (or other any definite value), then you
might ask: "why not 0.61 or 0.59?" Meanwhile, another question also arises: if
we consider that the truth value of "John is tall" is bigger than 0.6, then how much
John’s height should be? All these are the reflection of higher-order vagueness in
fuzzy set theory.
In fuzzy set theory, several solutions have been proposed by Zadeh [36], Grattan-
Guiness [14] and others [11, 16, 17, 19, 23, 32, 38] in response to the above prob-
lems. Zadeh took linguistic terms as the grades of membership of fuzzy sets, and
then these linguistic terms were modeled by fuzzy sets of type-n whose member-
ship function ranges over fuzzy sets of type n− 1. The membership function of
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a fuzzy set of type-1 ranges over the interval [0,1]. Another way to deal with
higher vagueness in fuzzy set theory is to replaced the interval [0,1] by the set
of subintervals of [0,1], which has been proposed by Grattan-Guiness. I. [14] in
1975. However, the above two strategies can only alleviated the problem of higher
vagueness to some extent, but it can not solve the problem authentically. In fact,
for fuzzy sets of type-n, we still need to define the membership functions of fuzzy
sets of type n−1. For interval valued fuzzy sets, we still need to define the subin-
tervals as the grades of membership of fuzzy sets. Hence, the difficulties here is
similar to that in Zadeh’s fuzzy sets.
2.4. Vagueness vs. Uncertainty, Randomness
Vagueness is also often confused with uncertainty and randomness. In general,
uncertainty is applied to predictions of future events, to physical measurements
that are already made, or to the unknown. It arises in partially observable and/or
stochastic environments, as well as due to ignorance and/or indolence. Douglas
W. Hubbard [18] defined uncertainty as: "The lack of complete certainty, that is,
the existence of more than one possibility. The "true" outcome/state/result/value
is not known". Uncertainty is encountered when an experiment (process, test, etc.)
is to proceed, the result of which is not known to us. Hence, uncertainty is always
connected with the question whether the given event may be regarded within some
time period, or not; there is no uncertainty after the experiment was realized and
the result is known to us.
Uncertainty emerges probably due to the lack of enough knowledge, probably
due to the shortcomings of our cognitive abilities, and also probably due to the
relatively poor technical conditions etc. Frequently, uncertainty will disappear
as long as these situations have been improved. Here you see that uncertainty
differs from vagueness, the latter has nothing to do with these outside conditions.
Vagueness only concerns the object itself under consideration and the way how it
is delineated according to its certain attribute, and won’t disappear as time passed.
You can say that the difference between uncertainty and vagueness corresponds to
the difference between potentiality and factuality.
In addition, Randomness is a specific form of uncertainty, and thus differs
from vagueness. Randomness suggests a non-order or non-coherence in a se-
quence of symbols or steps, such that there is no intelligible pattern or combi-
nation. Probability theory is the mathematical analysis of random phenomena,
probability can be thought of as a numerical measure of the likelihood that an
event will occur, its value is a number between 0 (0 percent chance or will not
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happen) and 1 (100 percent chance or will happen). In this sense, probability is
similar to membership degrees in fuzzy set theory.
2.5. What is vagueness?
Now, let’s go back to the previous questions: how exactly does vagueness
arise? what exactly fuzzy phenomena are? And what is its essence?
Based on the previous discussion, the thesis about vagueness defended in this
paper is that vagueness arises in the process of classifying objects, it is a kind
of manifestation of the continuity and gradualness existing in the process of de-
velopment and evolution of objects, and is the result of combined effect by the
continuity and gradualnes existing in the objects itself and human subjective cog-
nitive style. Vague phenomena are the external manifestations of vagueness.
For example, a person is impossible to become an adult from a baby in an
instant, the process is continual and evolutionary. When one regards this process
in a discrete point of view based on certain specific purpose (classification), or
divides this process into several discrete stages in a special way (describe each
stage in a vague predicate), consequently the continuity and gradualness existing
in objects themselves can not be revealed completely by such partition way, and
then the vagueness arises.
An usual way to discretize a continual and evolutionary process is to delineate
the process by using some natural linguistic terms (words or phrases, i.e., vague
predicates), a natural linguistic term labels a stage in the process, these natural
linguistic terms denote the main characteristic of each corresponding stage re-
spectively. In other words, natural language provides us with a very useful tool to
describe a continuous process in a discrete way. Hence, vagueness usually arises
together with the use of natural language.
Based on the above analysis, the occurrence of vagueness is not due to the
lack of human cognitive ability and technological means, and is also not due to
the complexity of objective things themselves, but is due to a specific cognitive
style (discretizing the continual and evolutionary process of objects) for objec-
tive things based on a certain cognitive aim (classifying objects). In this sense,
vagueness is a bridge to link discretization and continuity.
We make further explanation of vagueness by the following example. Let the
set of all Chinese be the domain of discourse, and consider the attribute "Age" of
Chinese. According to our common sense, a person’s age should be in the scope
of 0 to 200 (an optimistic estimate). It is a continuous process for one’s age to
change from 0 to 200, if we partition the process into several stages by labelling
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each stage with one of the following natural linguistic terms Infant, Childish, Ju-
venile, Young, Adult, Middle age, Elderly, Old, here the set Ω = {Infant, Childish,
Juvenile, Young, Adult, Middle age, Elderly, Old} will be called as a vague parti-
tion of Chinese with respect to the attribute "Age", then this discretized cognitive
style (the set Ω) hides the inherent continuity and gradualness existing in the at-
tribute "Age". Consequently, these predicates such as "is young", "is adult", "is
old" etc., show vagueness.
According to the origins, fuzzy phenomena can be divided into different types:
one-dimensional fuzzy phenomena, two-dimensional fuzzy phenomena, etc.
3. Some basic terminologies
In this section, we define several basic notions that will be needed in later sec-
tions: elementary vague attribute, vague attribute, vague space and vague judge-
ment.
In general, a concept (its meaning is clear for us) is determined by or in-
volved with one or a group of attributes, these attributes can be one-dimensional,
and can also be multidimensional. For example, Weight, Height, Age are one-
dimensional attributes with respect to the concept "Man", Length, Width, Height,
Color are also one-dimensional attributes with respect to the concept "Box", but
Area, Volume are multidimensional attributes with respect to the concept "Room".
It is worth noting that a multidimensional attribute can be determined usually
by several one-dimensional attributes. For example, Area is determined by one-
dimensional attributes Length and Width, and can be regarded as the Cartesian
product Length×Width.
Let C be a concept, we need to make a finite (or countable) partition of its
extension (which is usual a crisp (or classical) set) by linguistic terms according
to one or a group of attributes of C. From the previous exposition, we will find that
the partition is not sharply if the attributes acting as the standard of the partition is
characterized by continuity, in this case, we call such partition as vague partition
[27]. In this paper, we only consider the vague partition according to certain one-
dimensional attribute.
As an example, when we speak of someone’s height, we might prefer to say
that he (or she) is tall, short, or medium etc., rather than to say that he (or she) is
1.753 metres in height. Let C be the concept "Man" and ϕC the one-dimensional
attribute "Height". If we need to divide all men which are in certain fixed time
and space (e.g. Dutch men) into seven (of course, it can also be other numbers)
classes, then the set whose elements consist of names of all these classes, like the
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following
{Very Very Short, Very Short, Short, Medium, Tall, Very Tall, Very Very Tall}
is called the elementary set of vague attribute values of ϕC, denoted by ΩϕC , then
the set ΩϕC can be viewed as a vague or fuzzy partition of the extension of C ac-
cording to the attribute ϕC. The mathematical definition of vague partition will be
presented in the latter section. In what follows, we always denote the elementary
set of vague attribute values of ϕC with respect to the concept C by ΩϕC (which
can be effectively equivalent to the sample space in probability theory, the only
difference is that in vague membership degree theory, the elementary set of vague
attribute values is alterable according to different requirements of applications).
The elements in ΩϕC are called elementary vague attribute values with respect to
ϕC. In addition, the domain of discourse of the attribute ϕC, or the range of values
of measurement of ϕC, is denoted by UϕC . Based on the analysis in Section 1, the
set UϕC should be an interval. For example, let C be the concept "Man" and ϕC
the attribute "Age", then you can take the universe UϕC to be the interval [0,200]
according to the common sense.
Let F = {⊥,⊤,¬,⊼,⊻}, where ⊥,⊤ represent "nonexistent vague attribute
value" (e.g. "x is ⊥" means that x has no a certain attribute.) and "intrinsic vague
attribute value" (e.g. "x is ⊤" means that x must have a certain attribute.) re-
spectively, and ¬,⊼ and ⊻ represent the connectives "negation", "and" and "or"
respectively, which are used as the operations among various vague attribute val-
ues. The set of vague attribute values of the concept C with respect to the attribute
ϕC, denoted by ΣϕC , is the smallest set such that
• ⊥,⊤ ∈ ΣϕC .
• ΩψC ⊂ ΣϕC .
• If A ∈ ΣϕC , then ¬A ∈ ΣϕC .
• If A,B ∈ ΣϕC , then A⊼B,A⊻B ∈ ΣϕC .
• If A1,A2, · · · ,An, · · · ∈ ΣϕC , then ⊻∞i=1Ai,⊼∞i=1Ai ∈ ΣϕC .
In what follows, we call the triple (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,F ) vague space with respect to ϕC
(which can be effectively equivalent to the event field in probability theory), and
call these elements in ΣϕC vague attribute values with respect to ϕC. You may have
noticed that a vague attribute value can be in some sense regarded as an evaluating
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linguistic expression which has been introduced by Dvorˇák and Novák in [9]. As
mentioned above, Short is an elementary vague attribute value with respect to
"Height", the element Short ⊻Medium is also a vague attribute value with respect
to "Height", which means "Short or Medium", and can be named as the attribute
"Lower Medium".
Let x ∈UϕC , a vague judgement in vague space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,F ) with respect to
x is a procedure to determine these degrees to which these vague attribute values
in ΩϕC are possessed by the element x respectively. Put it in another way, a vague
judgement in vague space (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,F ) with respect to x is a series of statements
(vague propositions) "x is p", where p ∈ ΩϕC . For instance, let C be the concept
"Man" and ϕC the attribute "Height". Define ΩϕC and UϕC as
{Very Very Short, Very Short, Short, Medium, Tall, Very Tall, Very Very Tall}
and [0,3], respectively, and F = {⊥,⊤,¬,⊼,⊻} and ΣϕC is given accordingly. If
x = 1.7 metres ∈UϕC , then a vague judgement in vague space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,F ) with
respect to x consists of the following statements: "x is very very short"; "x is very
short"; "x is short"; "x is medium"; "x is tall"; "x is very tall"; "x is very very tall".
Furthermore, we can assign a real number in the unit interval [0,1] to each of these
statements, which are referred to as the truth values of these statements. The truth
value of the statement "x is p" (p ∈ ΩϕC) is a measure or estimation of the extent
that one trusts that x is p. According to fuzzy set theory, this truth value is also
called membership degree of x in fuzzy set A, where A is determined by the vague
attribute value p, and is a mathematical model of the extension of p. In a vague
judgement, the relationship among membership degrees of vague propositions is
the key point this paper focuses on, we will discuss this topic in detail in the next
section.
Now, let’s consider the previous example. "tall" (denoted by A) is a vague
attribute value of attribute "Height", A ∈ ΩHeight. We need to define the member-
ship function µA to model the extension of "tall man". Suppose that Tom is a 1.75
metres tall man, then how much the number µA(Tom) should be?
Let’s assume that Tom is an American, the time is 2015. We will find that the
value µA(Tom) will depend on the set ΩHeight. If
ΩHeight = {short, medium height, tall},
that is, people are divided into three classes, then you can take µA(Tom) = 0. This
is because in this case, you really believe that Tom is of medium build (because the
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average height of the American men is 1.75 metres), the degree of truth that Tom
is of medium build will be 1, and so µA(Tom) should be zero. But if ΩHeight =
{short, tall}, that is, people are divided into only two classes. In this case, Tom
will be incorporated into either the class of "short men" or the class of "tall men",
then maybe µA(Tom) = 0.6 will be reasonable.
This example tells us the fact that when we model a vague predicate using a
numerical method, it involves vague partition, that is, the set ΩϕC , must be con-
sidered.
4. The axioms for membership degrees
In this section, we present the system of axioms that will govern the relations
among various degrees of membership. Before that, we first review several funda-
mental concepts, "Triangular norm", "Triangular conorm" and "Strong negation",
which will be needed for the rest part of this paper. For more details, please refer
to [21].
Definition 4.1. A triangular norm (t-norm for short) is a binary operation T on
the unit interval [0,1], i.e., a function T : [0,1]2 → [0,1], such that for all x,y,z ∈
[0,1], the following four axioms are satisfied:
(T1) T (x,y) = T (y,x), (commutativity)
(T2) T (x,T (y,z)) = T (T (x,y),z), (associativity)
(T3) T (x,y)6 T (x,z) whenever y6 z, (monotonicity)
(T4) T (x,1) = x. (boundary condition)
Example 4.1. The following are the four basic t-norms TM,TP,TL, and TD given
by, respectively:
TM(x,y) = min{x,y}, (minimum)
TP(x,y) = x · y, (product)
TL(x,y) = max{x+ y−1,0}, (Łukasiewicz t-norm)
TD(x,y) =
{
0, if (x,y) ∈ [0,1)2,
min{x,y}, otherwise. (drastic product)
Definition 4.2. A triangular conorm (t-conorm for short) is a binary operation S
on the unit interval [0,1], i.e., a function S : [0,1]2 → [0,1], which, for all x,y,z ∈
[0,1], satisfies (T 1)-(T 3) and
(S4) S(x,0) = x. (boundary condition)
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Example 4.2. The following are the four basic t-conorms SM,SP,SL, and SD given
by, respectively:
SM(x,y) = max{x,y}, (maximum)
SP(x,y) = x+ y− x · y, (probabilistic sum)
SL(x,y) = min{x+ y,1}, (Łukasiewicz t-conorm, bounded sum)
SD(x,y) =
{
1, if (x,y) ∈ (0,1]2,
max{x,y}, otherwise. (drastic sum)
Since both t-norm and t-conorm are algebraic operations on the unit interval
[0,1], it is of course also acceptable to use infix notations like x⊗ y and x⊕ y
instead of the prefix notations T (x,y) and S(x,y) respectively. In what follows,
we will use these infix notations most of the time.
Definition 4.3. (i) A non-increasing function N : [0,1]→ [0,1] is called a negation
if
(N1) N(0) = 1 and N(1) = 0.
(ii) A negation N : [0,1]→ [0,1] is called a strict negation if, additionally,
(N2) N is continuous.
(N3) N is strictly decreasing.
(iii) A strict negation N : [0,1]→ [0,1] is called a strong negation if it is an invo-
lution, i.e., if
(N4) N ◦N = id[0,1] is continuous.
It is obvious that N : [0,1]→ [0,1] is a strict negation if and only if it is a
strictly decreasing bijection.
Example 4.3. (i) The most important and most widely used strong negation is the
standard negation NS : [0,1]→ [0,1] given by NS = 1− x. It can be proved that
each strong negation can be seen as a transformation of the standard negation,
see [21].
(ii) The negation N : [0,1]→ [0,1] given by N(x) = 1−x2 is strict, but not strong.
(iii) An example of a negation which is not strict and, subsequently, not strong, is
the Go¨del negation NG : [0,1]→ [0,1] given by
NG(x) =
{
1, if x = 0,
0, if x ∈ (0,1].
In order to deal with vagueness mathematically (numerically or formalized),
and establish the rigorous foundation for the mathematical analysis of vagueness,
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we propose the following axioms by which the membership degrees and their
interconnections are to be governed.
First of all, we only consider one-dimensional vague attribute values. Let C be
a concept, x ∈UϕC and (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,F ) a vague space with respect to the attribute
ϕC. The vague membership space with respect to ϕC (which is one-dimensional)
and associated with x is a quintuple (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ), where T = {N,⊕,⊗}
consists of a t-norm ⊗, a t-conorm ⊕ and a strong negation N. Mx is a real value
function (it is usually called the vague membership measure [28] on vague space
(ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,F ), or membership measure for short) from ΣϕC to [0,1] with respect
to x, satisfies the following axioms:
• Axiom I. For any A∈ ΣϕC , 06Mx(A)6 1, and there is at least one element
p ∈ ΩϕC such that Mx(p)> 0.
Axiom I says that for any A ∈ ΣϕC , the degree to which x has the vague
attribute value A is between 0 and 1, and x has at least one of elementary
vague attribute values to certain degree that is bigger than 0.
• Axiom II. Mx(⊥) = 0,Mx(⊤) = 1.
Axiom II says that any element x must have the attribute ϕC.
• Axiom III. For any vague attribute value A ∈ ΣϕC , Mx(¬A) =
(
Mx(A)
)N
,
where N is a strong negation on [0,1].
Axiom III says that the degree to which x doesn’t has the vague attribute
value A is equal to the result of the strong negation operation on the degree
to which it has the vague attribute value A.
• Axiom IV. The countable sum and countable product: for any vague at-
tribute values sequence: A1,A2, · · · ,An, · · · ∈ ΣϕC ,
Mx
(
⊻∞n=1 An
)
= Mx(A1)⊕Mx(A2)⊕·· ·⊕Mx(An)⊕·· · ,
and
Mx
(
⊼∞n=1 An
)
= Mx(A1)⊗Mx(A2)⊗·· ·⊗Mx(An)⊗·· · ,
where⊕,⊗ are triangular conorm and triangular norm respectively, and they
are mutually N-dual to each other, and N is same with that of Axiom III.
Axiom IV says that the degree to which x has the vague attribute value
⊻∞n=1An equals the result of the t-conorm operation on all these degrees to
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which it has each vague attribute value in the vague attribute values se-
quence, and that the degree to which x has the vague attribute value ⊼∞n=1An
equals the result of the t-norm operation on all these degrees to which it has
each vague attribute value in the vague attribute values sequence.
• Axiom V. For any p ∈ΩϕC , 0 <Mx(p)+
⊕
q∈ΩϕC\{p}
Mx(q)6 1, where ⊕
is a triangular conorm.
Axiom V says that the elements of ΩϕC are mutually exclusive to some
extent. It follows that if there is p0 ∈ ΩϕC such that Mx(p0) = 1, then for
any p ∈ ΩϕC , p 6= p0, we have Mx(p) = 0. In other words, if x has an
elementary vague attribute value p to the degree 1, then x will not has other
any elementary vague attribute value except p. In this sense, ΩϕC makes
a "partition" of UϕC , of course, this kind of partition is not a partition in
classical sense, and is a vague partition mentioned in Section 3.
The vague membership space (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ) is said to be regular if we
take Mx(p)+
⊕
q∈ΩϕC\{p}
Mx(q) = 1 in Axiom V.
From the definition of vague space and Axiom II-IV, it is easy to find that the
mapping Mx can be determined only by its values on ΩϕC . On the other hand,
the system of Axiom I-V are consistent, which can be shown by the following
example.
Example 4.4. Let UϕC = [0,200] and
ΩϕC = {[0,40],(40,80],(80,120],(120,160],(160,200]},
⊥= /0 and ⊤= [0,200], ⊻,⊼,¬ represent the basic set operations, namely union,
intersection and complement with respect to UϕC , respectively. ΣϕC is the set field
generated by ΩϕC . N is the standard negation on [0,1], ⊕ is the maximum or
Gödel t-conorm and ⊗ is the minimum or Gödel t-norm. Let x = 25, define the
function Mx as follows: Mx(⊥) = 0, Mx(⊤) = 1, Mx([0,40]) = 1 and
Mx((40,80]) = Mx((80,120]) = Mx((120,160]) = Mx((160,200]) = 0.
It is easy to show that Mx is a vague membership measure defined on the vague
space (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,F ). Hence, (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ) is a regular vague member-
ship space.
A vague membership space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ) is said to be normal if there
is an element p0 ∈ ΩϕC such that Mx(p0) = 1. In this case, x is said to be crisp
15
in the vague membership space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ). In fact, any partition in
classical sense of set X is a normal vague membership space with respect to any
x ∈ X , as it was shown in the above example. It is easy to show that any normal
vague membership space must be regular, not vice versa.
Example 4.5. Let C be the concept "Man" and ϕC the attribute "Age", UϕC =
[0,150] and ΩϕC = {youny,old}, ⊥= "no age" and ⊤= "age". ⊻,⊼,¬ represent
the connectives "or", "and" and "negation" respectively. Define
ΣϕC = {no age,age,young,old,not age,not old,young or old, · · ·}
such that (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,{⊻,⊼,¬}) is a vague space with respect to "Age", the opera-
tions N, ⊕ and ⊗ are defined as in Example 4.4. Let x = 35, define the function
Mx as follows: Mx(no age)= 0, Mx(age)= 1, Mx(young)=Mx(not old)= 0.6,
Mx(old) = Mx(not young) = 0.4, Mx(young or old) = max{0.6,0.4} = 0.6,
· · · · · · . It is easy to show that Mx is a vague membership measure defined on
the vague space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,F ). Hence, (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ) is a regular vague
membership space, but not a normal vague membership space.
In the following, some basic notions will be defined so that we can charac-
terize vague space and vague membership space more specifically. Let ax =⊕
p∈ΩϕC
{Mx(p)} and b = minx∈UϕC{ax}, then the number ax is called the de-
gree of sharpness of x in vague membership space (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ), and the
number 1−b is called the degree of separation of the set ΩϕC of elementary vague
attribute values.
For any A,B∈ ΣϕC , let c = maxx∈UϕC {Mx(A⊼B)}, c is called as the consistent
degree of A and B in vague space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,F ); A and B are said to be incompat-
ible in vague space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,F ) if for every element x ∈UϕC , Mx(A⊼B) = 0 in
vague membership space (ΩϕC,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ).
The mathematical analysis of vague phenomena, as one branch of mathemat-
ics, could and should be developed from the perspective of axiomatization in ex-
actly the same way as Probability, and Geometry and Algebra. This means that
after we have defined the elements to be studied and their basic relations, and have
stated the axioms by which these relations are to be governed, all further exposi-
tion must based exclusively on these axioms, independent of the usual concrete
meaning of these elements and their relations.
In accordance with the above discussion, in Section 3 the set of vague attribute
values is defined as a free algebra on the elementary set of vague attribute values.
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What the elements of this set represent is of no importance in the purely mathe-
matical development of the theory of vague membership degrees.
In what follows, for the sake of convenience, we denote a vague membership
space (ΩϕC ,ΣϕC ,Mx,F ,T ), which is with respect to the attribute ϕC of the con-
cept C and associated with x, by (Ω,Σ,M ,F ,T ) when it does not involve any
concrete problems.
5. Redefinition of the concept of fuzzy set
In this section, we will redefine the concept of fuzzy set based on the essence
of vagueness and the proposed axioms in Section 4. Before that, we firstly need
to present the mathematical definition of vague partition.
In what follow, unless otherwise stated, the symbols N+ denotes the set of
nonzero natural numbers N\{0}. For any n ∈N+, the set {1,2, · · · ,n} be denoted
by n.
Definition 5.1. Let U = [a,b]⊂R. A vague partition of U is an object having the
following form
U˜ = {µA1(x), · · · ,µAn(x)},n ∈ N+,
where the functions µAi : U → [0,1] (i = 1, · · · ,n) define the degrees of member-
ships of the element x ∈U to the class Ai, respectively, and satisfy the following
conditions:
(1) for any x ∈U, there is at least one i ∈ n such that µAi(x)> 0;
(2) for any i ∈ n, µAi(x) is continuous on U;
(3) for any i ∈ n, there is at least one x0 ∈U such that µAi(x0) = 1;
(4) for any i ∈ n, if µAi(x0) = 1 for x0 ∈U, then µAi(x) is non-decreasing on
[a,x0], and is non-increasing on [x0,b];
(5) 0 < µA1(x)+ · · ·+µAn(x)6 1 holds for any x ∈U.
If µA1(x)+ · · ·+µAn(x) = 1 in (5), then U˜ is said to be a regular vague parti-
tion.
From Definition 5.1, it is easy to show that for any i ∈ n and any x ∈U , µAi(x)
satisfies Axiom I and Axiom V, and the following two propositions are obvious.
Proposition 5.1. Let U = [a,b] ⊂ R and U˜ = {µA1(x), · · · ,µAn(x)},n ∈ N+, a
vague partition of U. Then for every x ∈U and i ∈ n,
0 < µAi(x)+max{µA j(x) | j ∈ n, j 6= i}6 1.
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Proposition 5.2. Let U = [a,b] ⊂ R and U˜ = {µA1(x), · · · ,µAn(x)},n ∈ N+, a
vague partition of U. For any i ∈ n, if µAi(x) = 1, then for any j ∈ n, j 6= i, we
have µA j(x) = 0.
Based on the essence of vagueness and vague partition, the concept of fuzzy
set can be redefined as follows:
Definition 5.2. Let U = [a,b]⊂R and U˜ = {µA1(x), · · · ,µAn(x)},n∈N+, a vague
partition of U. A fuzzy set A in U with respect to U˜ is a set of ordered pairs:
A = {(x,µA(x)) | x ∈U},
where the function µA(x) can be obtained by one of the following ways within
countable steps:
(1) there exists i ∈ n such that µA(x) = µAi(x) for all x ∈U;
(2) µA(x) = µ(x) = 0 for all x ∈U;
(3) µA(x) = µ(x) = 1 for all x ∈U;
(4) there exists i ∈ n such that µA(x) = (µAi(x))N for all x ∈U, where N is a
strong negation on [0,1];
(5) there exist i, j ∈ n such that µA(x) = µAi(x)⊗µA j(x) for all x ∈U, where
⊗ is a triangular norm;
(6) there exist i, j ∈ n such that µA(x) = µAi(x)⊕µA j(x) for all x ∈U, where
⊕ is a triangular conorm.
The set of all fuzzy sets in U with respect to U˜ will be denoted by F (U˜). In
fact, F (U˜) can be considered as a function space based on U˜.
Remark 5.1. In Definition 5.2, a fuzzy set is always defined on a real number in-
terval, this is due to the fact that vagueness stems from continuity as we discussed
in Section 1.
Remark 5.2. It is easy to show that a fuzzy set defined by Definition 5.2 is also
a fuzzy set in Zadeh’s sense, but not vice versa. This partially answered the first
question in Section 1, not any mapping from nonempty set U to [0,1] will deter-
mine a fuzzy set.
From Definition 5.2, on the one hand, when we define the membership func-
tion of extension of a vague concept, by vague partition U˜ , the relationship be-
tween this vague concept and its related vague concepts could be reflected into
the definitions of its membership function. This partially answered the second
question in Section 1.
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On the other hand, it’s different from Zadeh’s fuzzy sets that under Definition
5.2, the basic set operations, complement, intersection and union can be defined
only for these fuzzy sets under the same vague partition U˜ , that is, these fuzzy sets
in F (U˜). Hence, fuzzy sets in the same domain of discourse U will not always
be truth-functional. In this sense, the third question in Section 1, Edgington’s
confusion will disappear.
Example 5.1. In Netherlands in 2006, consider the concept "Man" and one of its
attribute "Height", let ΩHeight = {short, medium height, tall}. Let U = [0,3], and
denote the vague predicate "medium height" by A2, the membership function µA2
of A2 is defined as follows
µA2(x) =


0, 06 x < 1.35;
2.5(x−1.35), 1.356 x < 1.75;
1, 1.756 x < 1.89;
20(1.94− x), 1.896 x < 1.94;
0, 3> x> 1.94.
Denote the vague predicate "short" by A1, and the membership function µA1(x) of
A1 is defined as follows
µA1(x) =


1, 06 x6 1.35;
2.5(1.75− x), 1.35 < x6 1.75;
0, 3> x > 1.75.
Denote the vague predicate "tall" by A3, and the membership function µA3(x) of
A3 is defined as follows
µA3(x) =


0, 06 x < 1.89;
20(x−1.89), 1.896 x6 1.94;
1, 3> x > 1.94.
It is easy to prove that {µA1(x),µA2(x),µA3(x)} is a vague partition of U. By Defi-
nition 5.2, A1 = {(x,µA1(x)) | x∈U},A2 = {(x,µA2(x)) | x∈U},A3 = {(x,µA3(x)) |
x ∈ U},¬A1 = {(x,(µA1(x))N) | x ∈ U},A1 ⊼ A2 = {(x,µA1(x)⊗ µA2(x)) | x ∈
U}, · · · · · · are fuzzy sets in U.
Let x = 1.5, we have
µA1(x)(1.5) = 0.625,µA2(x)(1.5) = 0.375,µA3(x)(1.5) = 0.
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Obviously, compared with Zadeh’s fuzzy sets, here the membership degrees 0.625
with respect to A1, 0.325 with respect to A2 and 0 with respect to A3 could provide
us with more comprehensive information about the height attribute of the object
with height of 1.5.
Conversely, given membership degree (e.g. 0.4) with respect to the fuzzy set
A2, how to find the object x whose membership degree to A2 is exactly equal to
0.4? For this, if we also know other relevant information (e.g. the membership
degree 0.6 with respect to A3, the membership degree 0 with respect to A1), that is,
we know that µA1(x) = 0,µA2(x) = 0.4,µA3(x) = 0.6, then from these membership
degrees and the membership functions of A1, A2 and A3, it is easy to find that
x = 1.92.
From the above example, it is easy to see that compared with Zadeh’s fuzzy sets,
the fuzzy sets by Definition 5.2 could describe vague concepts more delicately.
This is easy to understand because Definition 5.2 includes the background infor-
mation (the vague partition) of a vague concept into the definition of its member-
ship function.
In addition, it’s worth pointing out that intuitionistic fuzzy sets [1] are similar
to fuzzy sets by Definition 5.2 in some ways.
Intuitionistic fuzzy sets model the extensions of vague concepts by two func-
tions, the membership function and the nonmembership function. By the mu-
tual restriction between the two functions, the subjectivity existing in defining the
membership function will be weakened, and then more reasonable membership
function can be obtained. However, intuitionistic fuzzy sets are still fail to reflect
the relationship between a vague concept and its related vague concepts, which
can be found from the following example:
Consider vague concept "men of medium height" (denoted by A2) in Nether-
lands in 2006, its membership function is µA2(x) as defined in Example 5.1, its
nonmembership function can be defined as νA2(x) = 1− µA2(x). Let Tom and
Jack are two Dutch men, Tom is 1.51 metres tall, Jack is 1.92 metres tall. By the
intuitionistic fuzzy set
A2 = {(x,µA2(x),νA2(x))|x ∈U},
we have µA2(1.51)= µA2(1.92)= 0.4 and νA2(1.51)= νA2(1.92)= 0.6. However,
Tom and Jack are two totally different men in height, but this kind of difference
can’t be reflected by the corresponding intuitionistic fuzzy set A2.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the essence and features of vague phenomena, pro-
posed an axiomatic system to govern membership degrees and their interconnec-
tions. More importantly, we refined the concept of fuzzy set based on vague par-
tition from the perspective of axiomatization.
The approach used in the paper is similar to the axiomatization of probability
theory by Kolmogorov [22] in some ways. This is done under the consideration
that although vagueness is different from randomness from their origins as we
have mentioned in Section 1, but they are similar in other ways, especially from
the perspective of epistemology. Probability of a random event is a numerical
measure of the likeliness that this event will occur. Probability theory focus more
on the relationship among random events in a sample space, rather than the accu-
racy of the probability values (numbers between 0 and 1). In other words, proba-
bility theory characterizes random phenomena from a global and overall point of
view (consider random events in a probability space). The mathematical model
treating vagueness aims at modelling vague phenomena approximately in terms
of a kind of numerical measure, and the key point we care about is also not the
accuracy (e.g. 0.6 or 0.59) of degrees of membership of objects in fuzzy sets, but
is the consistency between vague predicates and their membership functions. In
other words, the main aim of fuzzy set theory is to provide a numerical method to
describe the relationship among objects and the relationship among vague predi-
cates, thus membership functions of fuzzy sets need to be able to reflect definitely
these relationships. Hence, the relationship among vague attribute values should
also be the starting point to recognize and model vague phenomena from a quan-
titative view. In this sense, probability theory and vague membership theory are
similar.
Meanwhile, we should also be aware that Lebesgue’s theories of measure and
integration, which have been applied successfully to establish theory of probabil-
ity, are not suitable to establish the axiomatical foundation of membership degree
theory for vagueness. For example, the intersection of two sets ({medium height}
and {tall}) is an empty set, but it is obvious that the conjunction of two vague
attribute values "medium height" and "tall" can generated a new vague attribute
value. Hence, in this paper, we established the axiomatical foundation of mem-
bership degree theory based on free algebra not sigma algebra.
In addition, this paper also explained the relation between natural language
and fuzzy sets, that is, natural language provides a kind of tool to discretize a
continual and evolutionary process. Another point we hope to emphasize here is
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that fuzzy sets discussed in this paper are always defined on a real number interval,
we insist that fuzzy sets defined on finite universe have nothing to do with vague
phenomena from the essence.
We hope that the work in this paper should provide with an axiomatical math-
ematical model for dealing with vague phenomena from a many-valued point of
view. It’s also our hope that this work can serve as the axiomatical foundation
to expound those long-standing controversies and divergences in fuzzy set theory
and its applications. We think that a good formalized theory or method treating
vagueness should have the resources to accommodate all the different types of
vague phenomena, and its intuitive meaning is clear.
Maybe you have found that in this paper, our discussion about vague concepts
is proceeded in a fixed time and space. In the coming work, we will consider the
time and space factors into the vague partition just like the concept of stochastic
process in probability theory, we hope to obtain some corresponding results which
can be used to model the vagueness of in different states, or to model the change
of vague phenomena over time.
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